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A Long-Term
Counterinsurgency
Strategy
JOHN JAMES PATTERSON VI

T

he rapid, decisive campaign conducted against the Taliban by US Special
Operations Forces (SOF) in conjunction with the Northern Alliance and
supported by US airpower in the opening phases of Operation Enduring
Freedom (OEF) captured the attention of military professionals throughout
the world—allies and potential adversaries alike. Heralded as a template
for future military transformation by the most enthusiastic proponents,
even the less sanguine observers were forced to acknowledge an impressive synergy and economy of force in the SOF and airpower combination.
Nearly eight years later, former International Security Assistance Forces
(ISAF) Commander, General Stanley McChrystal, issued a tactical directive
seeking, among other things, to limit the use of Close Air Support (CAS)
by NATO forces in Afghanistan.1 This action followed several high-profile
incidences of collateral damage caused by air strikes in support of ISAF
forces and signaled a broader shift in theater strategy toward a counterinsurgency (COIN) centric approach similar to that successfully employed
in conjunction with the “surge” in Iraq. While comparisons are inevitable,
such a strategy needs to address significant additional challenges posed by
the unique cultural and geographical characteristics of Afghanistan which
could in effect make the restriction of airpower as much a danger to the
achievement of strategic objectives as the collateral damage that it seeks
to avoid. One prominent dilemma is the central role that SOF continues
to play in performing many key strategic functions, such as counterterrorism (CT) and counterinsurgency operations. There is a paradox posed
by the fact that the characteristics, which render SOF an ideal choice for
Afghanistan’s dispersed and geographically isolated rural insurgency, also
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engender increased reliance upon the mobility, responsiveness, and firepower provided by airpower. This article will examine the unique suitability
of SOF to meet strategic objectives in Afghanistan, explore the synergistic
relationship between SOF and airpower, and assess the strategic utility of
this combat-proven combination in an irregular warfare environment.
Putting the “Special” in Special Operations
Special Operations Forces share a number of uniquely defining qualities which distinguish them from their conventional counterparts. Despite
a broad consensus that SOF have a distinct military culture with distinctive
capabilities, no universally accepted, definitive work exists codifying the
character of special operations. There is, however, a substantial amount of
published material on the subject. This article is an attempt to construct a
platform for further analysis by synthesizing the key elements of several
notable contemporary special operations theorists.
Adaptability, Flexibility, and Versatility
In his analysis of the decisive characteristics of SOF following the
now iconic tactical and operational successes of US SOF teamed with the
Northern Alliance over Taliban forces in late 2001 and early 2002, Colonel
John Jogerst notes “You don’t know what you need until you need it. A
wide range of capabilities in effective quantities is a good hedge against
tomorrow’s threat.”2 Admiral Eric T. Olsen, Commander, United States
Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), similarly posits: “We need to
be responsive enough to adjust rapidly to what the enemy throws at us, and
we need to have the agility to transcend the spectrum of conflict.”3 Colin
Gray affirms the innovative nature of special operations, further noting that
successful SOF units such as the British Special Air Service have institutionalized the ability to reinvent themselves as national security interests
require.4 Building upon Gray’s work, Australian Squadron Leader David
Jeffcoat identifies “unorthodox means” as one of his proposed characteristics of SOF, which are “required to adapt their approach to each operation
and come up ‘with a distinctive theory of victory.’”5 In short, SOF team
members are traditionally selected for an innate adaptive ability that is
further cultivated in training. They are employed with the assumed capability to respond with agility to diverse, unforeseen threats from unpredictable
enemies, often employing their own strengths asymmetrically while seeking
to deny a similar advantage to their adversaries. Present-day SOF counterinsurgency and counterterrorist operations in Afghanistan embody the
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unconventional challenge in which the United States needs to capitalize on
the SOF’s adaptability, versatility, and flexibility to achieve success.
Speed, Agility, and Stealth
Jeffcoat asserts that unique to SOF is “the expectation of commanders borne out of historical examples of SO [Special Operations] that SF
[Special Forces] will invariably achieve relative superiority over a larger
enemy and therefore win.”6 Achievement of tactical surprise is often cited
as one of the keys to victory in the face of a numerically superior foe.
Specifically, however, in terms of special operations forces themselves it
is the characteristics of speed, stealth, and agility (with a healthy dose of
technology) which enable this critical principle.7 It is the ability of SOF to
appear on the battlefield at an unexpected place and time of their choosing
which, coupled with an offensive mind-set, enables them to retain the initiative and achieve surprise.
Implicit in the need for speed is the requirement to travel light and
leverage technology for mobility and firepower. Of the former, Lieutenant
Colonel Eugene McFeely, referencing the counterinsurgency manual, US
Army Field Manual 3-24, asserts that US forces in Afghanistan “must
lighten their combat loads and enforce a habit of speed and mobility to gain
maneuver parity with the lightly equipped insurgent.”8 Jeffcoat articulates
the requirement for “high relative speed to swiftly reach the objective despite
the actions of the adversary,” which, he tellingly adds, “invariably translates
to a dependency on aircraft.”9 Agility, similarly, implies the ability to respond
faster than the enemy once engaged. More than heavy conventional forces,
SOF can “operate and maneuver in the face of enemy action.”10 Finally,
SOF achieve stealth, or the ability to remain undetected by the enemy until
the moment of decisive engagement, through the effective application of
signature management, optimized by SOF’s small footprint and extensive
training as well as through dedicated, effective intelligence and “intensive
and comprehensive study of their targets.”11 Thus, speed, agility, and stealth
are critical enablers for SOF in countering the asymmetric advantages of
experienced, elusive insurgent fighters, with extensive early warning networks and local terrain knowledge.
Cultural Awareness, Maturity, and Interoperability
Counterinsurgency, together with unconventional warfare (UW),
foreign internal defense (FID), counterterrorism, and stability operations
comprise irregular warfare (IW), an SOF core competency. The successful prosecution of IW requires what Squadron Leader Jeffcoat refers to as
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“assimilation.”12 He further explains: “Without a high degree of cultural
awareness, it is unlikely SF will be able to gain the required level of trust
and cooperation from sympathetic local elements . .
Future war will include both change
. .”13 In addition to a solid
and continuity from the past.
institutional
experience
base, cultural awareness is
cultivated through training, regional specialization, and habitual international partnerships which focus on international military capacity building in
the traditional SOF mission of foreign internal defense. “On a typical day,”
notes Admiral Olsen, “the operational forces of the US Special Operations
Command can be found in 60 to 70 countries, primarily conducting foreign
internal defense and civil affairs operations.”14
Cultural awareness, and the maturity imparted by the greater age and
experience level of the individual special operator (for instance, an average
Army Special Forces soldier is nearly 32 years old as compared with 19
years old for the average Marine)15 combine to enhance effective mission
execution in the complex, nuanced COIN environment. US Air Force Major
General Charles Dunlap underscores the value of maturity in counterinsurgency, asserting that COIN “is not just manpower-intensive; it requires a
particular kind of manpower that is difficult to recruit, train and maintain.”16
He further notes that while the US Army has continued to meet its recruiting
goals despite the strain of a conflict entering its eighth year (2008), it has
done so in part by increasing waivers granted for forces without high school
diplomas as well as “moral waivers,” for forces with juvenile or criminal
records, noting: “While such recruits may make competent general-purpose
forces, they are not the prized counterinsurgency professionals described
in FM 3-24.”17 With all respect to General Krulak’s “strategic corporal,”
perhaps the “strategic sergeant first class” of a Special Forces Operational
Detachment Alpha or the “strategic chief petty officer” of a Navy SEAL
team is a better match for the complex challenge of COIN.18
Additionally, special operations forces exhibit a uniquely high
level of interoperability in both the joint and combined force environment. The “jointness” of SOF derives in part from the fact that SOF
“depends on a range of specialized military capabilities and assets to
achieve their mission.”19 This, in turn, has led to the recognition that
“interoperability comes by interoperating regularly, routinely, and often”
with the result that “SOF personnel jointly conduct virtually all training
above the individual skill level.”20 Prime examples of habitual training
relationships exist between Army Special Forces, Navy SEALs, and Air
Force Special Tactics Squadron personnel and key aviation enablers in the
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Army’s 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment and the Air Force’s
1st Special Operations Wing. Additionally, regular fire support exercises
such as Jaded Thunder and Known Battle fold in conventional aviation
and fire support assets from all the services in realistic SOF-centric training scenarios. The end result is a mature, experienced, culturally aware,
and interoperable force that is uniquely equipped to perform successfully
in a complex operating environment.
Hyper-Competence and Independence
Special operations forces, regardless of service or specialty, are the
product of highly selective training and accession processes, often selected
from the most successful among the ranks of conventional forces. Service
in SOF units is voluntary and selection is a continuous process. It has been
said that the only task more difficult than earning a place in special operations is retaining that place. This institutional self-selection, coupled with
exceptionally rigorous training standards, combine to produce an environment of hyper-competence, or what Jeffcoat calls “purposefulness,” which
he defines as the “strong and unrelenting desire to achieve the objective.”21
Colin Gray regards the assumption of tactical competence among SOF as
being “so obvious that it requires no particular emphasis.”22
Another hallmark of SOF related to a high degree of tactical competence is independence. Jogerst asserts that special operators are perhaps
uniquely equipped to successfully achieve the ideal of decentralized, or
network-distributed mission execution.23 Combining a high degree of tactical competence, network-distributed command and control, and practiced
interoperability with airpower, special forces teams with embedded Air Force
air-control elements provide a tactical force with a broad range of skills and
the maturity to execute mission orders without detailed oversight.”24
In short, special operations forces possess a repertoire of capabilities
and attributes that imbues them with a unique strategic utility. “That utility
reposes most essentially in two qualities, economy of force and expansion of
strategic choice,” asserts Colin Gray, adding: “In the most general of terms,
special operations forces offer the prospect of a favorably disproportionate return on military investment.”25 As of this writing, the United States
is entering its tenth year of conflict in Afghanistan amid waning domestic
support, increasing economic strain, and increasingly persistent questions
about Afghan governmental legitimacy. Presented with a continuum of less
than palatable strategic options ranging from the abandonment of regional
objectives and a massive counterinsurgency effort requiring burgeoning
conventional force levels and nearly open-ended force commitments, the
economy of force option would seem to represent the sine qua non for success.
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Air Support to Special Operations
Recognition of the utility of airpower to the successful prosecution
of irregular warfare dates nearly to the origins of combat airpower itself. A
US Air Force-sponsored study by RAND Corporation published in 1964
examined the role of air support in the conduct of counterinsurgency and
unconventional warfare and identified the unique challenges posed by the
use of airpower in an IW environment:
In the counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare cases where
close air support was available, the potential targets were generally
small groups of the enemy in areas that also contained friendly
civilians, thus constraining close support air attacks to avoid killing,
injuring, or alienating civilians.26

With the problem thusly framed, it is useful to examine three key
characteristics of airpower which, coupled with advances in technology, tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), have both increased the
efficacy of airpower in support of special operations forces and served to
mitigate the inherent challenges posed by the application of airpower in an
IW environment.
Precision
Perhaps no aspect of modern airpower has received more attention
or been the subject of more prolific discussion and publication than the
precision of modern air-delivered weapons. Recognition of the revolution
of precision in the application of modern airpower has come (if grudgingly)
from even the most unlikely sources. In 2008, Human Rights Watch senior
military analyst Marc Garlasco admitted that “airstrikes probably are the
most discriminating weapon that exists.”27
Most of the relevant discussion of airpower’s precision has centered
around the development and proliferation of modern Precision Guided
Munitions (PGMs). Arguably beginning with the first combat usage of
Paveway I Laser Guided Bombs against the “Dragon’s Jaw” bridge in North
Vietnam in 1972, the PGM revolution has continued unabated, finding its
most recent expression in the use of Global Positioning System (GPS) aided
and Inertial Navigation System (INS) guided weapons such as the Joint
Direct Attack Munition (JDAM), which can be employed in any weather
condition and with no requirement for the delivery platform to optically
acquire the target. Besides delivery accuracy, recent efforts to tailor warhead
effects for increased target discrimination have led to the development of
low collateral damage warheads.28 Even the creative use of fuse functioning delays on PGMs with conventional high explosive warheads and PGM
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guidance kits on inert warheads have been employed to mitigate weapon
effects to personnel and structures surrounding legitimate targets. In the
case of PGMs, weapon delivery accuracy and warhead discrimination are
factors which, in addition to facilitating efficient target destruction, mitigate
the risk of fratricide and collateral damage posed by air-delivered weapons.
Both are largely characteristics of the weapons.29 As such, both contribute
to mission success only if the weapon in question is delivered against the
correct target. Equally important, though less often discussed, are concurrent developments in technology and TTPs that facilitate target location,
marking, correlation, and confirmation in order to ensure that the correct
target is attacked.
While advances in weapons technology have increased the likelihood of desired effects on the target and the mitigation of undesired
effects on personnel and structures in proximity to the target, advancements in situational awareness of delivery aircrews, facilitated by these
new improvements, have had similar impact by improving the possibility
of destroying the correct target. On the technological side of the equation, the proliferation of advanced, high resolution Infrared/Electro-Optical
sensors on aircraft have increased the level of image resolution available
to aircrews, facilitating better target discrimination, even from tactically
significant stand-off ranges. Concurrently, the proliferation of “coordinate
seeking” weapons such as JDAM removes the requirement for aircrew to
visually acquire the target.30 Increasing availability and usage of Laser Spot
Trackers onboard strike aircraft to confirm target location in conjunction
with both ground-based and airborne Laser Target Designators used by
terminal controllers have significantly enhanced the speed and accuracy
of target acquisition and confirmation in addition to their traditional role
in guiding laser-guided PGMs.31 Perhaps even more significant has been
the proliferation of Laser Target Markers (LTMs). Increasingly integral
to advanced aircraft targeting pods and almost ubiquitous among ground
based Joint Target Acquisition Centers (JTACs) owing to their impressive
power to size ratios, LTMs are employed in a similar role to cue aircrews
equipped with night vision devices.32 Concurrently, employment of small
laptop computer and even personal data assistant (PDA) hosted imagery
based precision coordinate generation software have brought similar benefit
to the employment of GPS/INS targeted weapons.33
The net result of these advances in technology and the TTPs that
support their effective employment has been an exponential increase in the
target discrimination and weapon effectiveness of air-delivered weapons.
Coupled with the skill of SOF JTACs—such as US Air Force Combat
Controller Teams (CCT) and Tactical Air Control Parties—all facilitated by
the level of interoperability previously outlined, the inherent precision of
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modern airpower makes a significant contribution to overcoming the daunting challenges in a counterinsurgency environment. First, the precision of
modern airpower enables the delivery of timely and accurate overwhelming firepower in support of light, agile forces which, though highly skilled,
lack significant organic firepower. Second, precision enables effective and
efficient engagement of targets in close proximity to friendly forces and noncombatants while minimizing the risks of fratricide and collateral damage.
Persistence
The second revolution of modern airpower is the revolution of persistence. With advanced expeditionary basing (including sea basing), modern
aerial refueling capability, and advancements in aircraft endurance, airpower
today is capable of a more profound operational footprint on the battlespace
than at any time in its history. Nowhere has the persistence revolution
been more apparent than in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
(ISR) aircraft, of both the manned and unmanned varieties. Further, there is
perhaps no more poignant example of the impact of persistent ISR than in
support of SOF engaged in counterterrorism. In an impressive monograph
summarizing the historical development of the manhunting methodology of
counter-network operations employed by CT forces, George Crawford of the
Joint Special Operations University notes “persistence pays” in the application of the Find-Fix-Finish-Exploit-Analyze targeting cycle employed by
CT forces.34 The proliferation of airborne ISR assets in Iraq and Afghanistan
has enabled an unprecedented level of “pattern of life” intelligence collection against high value individual (HVI) targets. In fact, ISR in both theaters
is quantified in terms of numbers of 24-hour “orbits” of both imagery intelligence and signals intelligence capability, affording the opportunity for a
true “unblinking eye” on multiple targets simultaneously.35
In the more indirect role, SOF can use persistent ISR in a force
protection role, securing the flanks and acting as a virtual cavalry screen
on a 360-degree battlefield consisting of small teams widely dispersed to
geographically remote locations conducting rural counterinsurgency operations. In this role, airborne ISR assets can be used for early warning and
overwatch, cueing friendly forces to enemy activity and later supporting
battle hand-over and target designation to strike aircraft as needed, or even
performing limited kinetic strikes from the armed ISR aircraft.
Skeptical of the feasibility of achieving the required force level for
a broad, doctrinal counterinsurgency campaign consistent with the 20 to
1,000 troop-to-insurgent ratio suggested by FM 3-24,36 General Dunlap
alternatively suggests that the persistence of modern airpower combined
with a small SOF footprint on the ground serves as a necessary economy
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of force measure in COIN: “The United States has to develop technology
capable of substituting for ‘boots-on-the-ground’ in order to provide future
decision makers with broader options. Pragmatism drives this approach, not
any deficiency in the valor or dedication of US ground forces.”37 Dunlap
joins fellow strategist Phillip Meilinger in suggesting that such an SOF and
airpower centric approach to COIN “is imperative . . . to completely recast
America’s approach to COIN in an effort to achieve ‘politically desirable
results with the least cost in blood and treasure.’”38 The smaller footprint
of SOF enabled by the persistence of supporting airpower may actually
remove a significant source of fuel from an insurgency. Dunlap further supports this observation, contending that “the notion that American COIN
or nation-building efforts can be executed by infusing the host state with
large numbers of US forces is fundamentally flawed. In fact, the deeply
entrenched view of US forces as an occupation force is now the main rallying point for anti-American feelings . . . .”39
It is also important to note that persistent airpower can be employed
clandestinely and covertly in a permissive COIN environment.40 While
some of the more obvious examples are clandestine intelligence collection
and overwatch of an infiltrating assault force on a clandestine direct action
mission, clandestine and covert applications of airpower include persistent
on-call “finish” capability for the kinetic time-sensitive targeting of fleeting
high-value targets as well. Such covert applications may even occur in areas
denied to US ground forces, as in the case of the increasingly publicized
and controversial Predator unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) kinetic strikes in
Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas. Persistent airborne ISR and
strike capability provide a risk-mitigating—and even potentially deniable—
means of support to SOF engaged in covert, denied area operations, should
the emergence of an especially lucrative target set justify the diplomatic and
political risk of such missions.41
Conversely, the persistence of modern airpower affords significant
strategic benefits when overtly employed, as well. General Dunlap asserts
that the overt use of persistent ISR has significant psychological impact on
the enemy, arguing “airpower can now inflict on insurgents the same kind
of disconcerting sense of vulnerability that the enemy sought to impose
upon US forces via improvised explosive devices,” perhaps the most iconic
embodiments of asymmetry employed in the Iraq and Afghan insurgencies.42 But the persistence revolution is not limited to ISR; airpower provides
the availability of persistent kinetic effects, as well. In one of numerous
accounts, The New York Times captures the sense of helplessness of an
Afghan insurgent resulting from his encounter with airpower: “We pray to
Allah that we have American soldiers to kill . . . [but] . . . these bombs
from the sky we cannot fight.”43 In particular, the recent employment of
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long-range bombers as general support to on-call close air support assets
provides a previously unknown level of persistent firepower to counterinsurgent forces. Combined with regular air tasking order “lines” of direct and
general support CAS fighter sorties, the persistence of coalition airpower
approaches that of conventional artillery, but with the added firepower and
precision of modern air-delivered PGMs.
Reach
The expansive reach of modern airpower constitutes a third revolution in its effectiveness as a strategic enabler. As a powerful mitigator
of the perennial twin tyrannies of distance and terrain, the global reach of
airpower is perhaps most poignantly demonstrated in the synergy of the
SOF-airpower relationship. In this regard, it is airpower’s contribution to
SOF’s mobility and access to precision fires which are most notable.
Mobility is more than a mere logistical enabler for SOF. Rather, it
defines, in combination with the aforementioned SOF attributes of speed,
agility, and stealth, what could more properly be considered a core competency. The mobility afforded to SOF by fixed and rotary-wing aircraft—both
organic and inorganic—together with their fire support analogs convert
the potential liabilities of “lightness” and small footprint into decisive
asymmetric advantages. In addition to maximizing agility and stealth on
the ground, the small size and light nature of SOF permit the decisive air
movement of entire SOF tactical formations throughout the battlespace.
They render practical the existence of a separate organic air arm of specialized SOF specific aircraft belonging to the Air Force Special Operations
Command and the Army’s 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment.
These organic air assets enjoy a level of interoperability developed through
the aforementioned habitual training and operating relationship with their
SOF customers, which enhance the effectiveness of all joint operations and
facilitate a level of specialized capabilities unique to SOF, including specialized insertion techniques such as fast-rope helicopter assault and military
free-fall parachute operations which uniquely position SOF to maximize the
mobility potential of airpower.
With a long history of irregular warfare conducted from the forbidding geographical sanctuary of the Hindu-Kush Mountains which dominate
eastern and southern Afghanistan, Afghan insurgents have grown both
accustomed to and reliant upon unilateral access to this terrain as an asymmetric advantage over traditionally road-bound, mechanized adversaries.
Whether by means of now conventional vertical envelopment by heliborne
assault first demonstrated effectively in combat in the Ia Drang Valley in
1965, fast-rope insertion to mountainous objectives without suitable landing
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zones (LZs), or one of the specialized variations of military free-fall insertion, SOF supported by organic air mobility and effective multi-source
ISR represent a means to significantly neutralize the key insurgent advantage of terrain in Afghanistan. Using suitably tailored SOF elements and
radar-equipped aircraft in terrain following flight profiles (even in adverse
weather), stand-off ISR for threat and detection avoidance, and offset LZs to
minimize auditory and visual signature of the assault force, the preservation
of SOF’s characteristic stealth can be compounded by the speed and access
afforded by air mobility. Together with the increased access provided by air
mobility, the small footprint and organic aviation of SOF help to neutralize
another asymmetric insurgent advantage: the improvised explosive device
(IED). Far less dependent upon road-bound vehicular transport for logistic support than their conventional counterparts, SOF are inherently less
susceptible to what has proven statistically to be the deadliest of insurgent
tactics first in Iraq and, more recently, in Afghanistan.
In addition to the advantages which mobility has brought to bear
against the challenging terrain in Afghanistan, SOF have benefitted from
technological advances in PGMs which have extended the reach of effective
fire support. The advent of INS/GPS weapons with programmable attack
azimuth and impact angle capabilities independent of delivery platform
and profile has virtually eliminated the existence of defilade from a fire
support perspective.44 Thermobaric warheads, now employed in weapons
ranging from hand grenades to Hellfire missiles, as well as advanced “penetrator” warheads have combined with the proliferation of targeting quality
coordinate generation technologies (including the tactical, handheld variety
available to SOF-embedded Air Force Combat Control Teams) to effectively
solve even the most challenging targeting problems such as caves, bunkers,
and box canyons posed by Afghanistan’s forbidding terrain.45
In addition to extending the reach of SOF combat power with respect
to terrain, airpower, in terms of both mobility and fire support, has recently
demonstrated an impressive mastery over imposing distances. In one of
the most demonstrative examples of the former, the opening stages of OEF
featured historically significant helicopter assaults by SOF based aboard the
aircraft carrier USS Kitty Hawk in the Indian Ocean over unprecedented
distances against high-value targets in Afghanistan. Similarly, the transcontinental bombing missions of USAF B-2 Spirit bombers from Whiteman
Air Force Base in central Missouri to strike targets in Afghanistan has
become a strategically emblematic demonstration of the global reach of
kinetic airpower. The straightforward nature of such missions belies an
equally impressive mastery of logistic and aerial refueling capability. Such
examples, combined with carrier-based aircraft as effectively demonstrated
by the aforementioned USS Kitty Hawk example, effectively underscore a
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diminishing dependence upon access to regional basing which is not trivial.
In short, the global reach of airpower provides the ability to deliver significant tactically tailored SOF combat power at the decisive place and time,
preserving tactical surprise, and increasingly independent of the tyranny of
distance and terrain.
Conclusion
The manifest operational benefits of modern airpower’s key characteristics of precision, persistence, and reach have combined with the unique
characteristics of SOF to impart a strategically significant synergistic effect.
The speed and mobility afforded by the reach of airpower is abetted by
the lightness and small footprint of SOF, while its persistence and precision concurrently compensate for the lack of organic mass and firepower
engendered by these same characteristics. In other words, airpower, most
particularly in the context of its uniquely synergistic relationship with SOF,
constitutes perhaps the single most effective asymmetric US advantage in
the operational environment of irregular warfare. Though many reasons for
the effectiveness of this combination are articulated above, the asymmetric
nature of the SOF-airpower combination with respect to COIN in particular
is worthy of emphasis, as the nature of the COIN fight is almost by definition permissive with respect to airpower. While COIN presents innumerable
difficult political and military challenges on the ground, insurgents by their
very nature typically lack the high-end, anti-access capabilities (such as
an air force or integrated air defense system) which constitute a credible
counter to modern airpower.
While it is both necessary and proper to acknowledge the potential
for the deleterious strategic effect of collateral damage incurred through
the (often improper) use of airpower to the successful conduct of COIN
(exhaustively documented elsewhere), the author’s primary contention is
that the maturity, interoperability, and tactical competence of SOF combined
with on-going technological and procedural innovations effectively mitigates such risk to a degree well below the level of nullifying the constructive
contribution of the SOF-airpower team in the calculus of strategic effects.
Furthermore, excessive aversion to collateral damage resulting in a denial of
effective fire support to coalition forces risks exacting a potentially debilitating cost in US and coalition blood, treasure, and political will. Finally, it
is worth noting that technological and procedural advances that contribute
to the combat effectiveness of airpower (e.g., the precision revolution) often
serve to mitigate the risk of collateral damage caused by airpower, contributing to the likelihood that future prospects for the strategic calculus will
continue to improve.
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Entering a second decade of war, the United States is faced with
the probability of a future characterized by persistent conflict. Unable to
challenge America’s conventional military strength, adversaries such as al
Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan will continue to seek the asymmetry
of irregular warfare, and will further seek to open new fronts in a global
landscape filled with failed or failing states, rogue states, and ungoverned
spaces within states. The global demands of US interests on the military in
the “Long War” offer the distinct possibility of exceeding the means available, particularly amid the likelihood of shrinking defense budgets resulting
from continued economic strain. Further compounding the problem,
potential adversaries will likely be emboldened by the perception of US
military overextension. Such an environment will require difficult choices
for American policy-makers—choices that will require a potentially painful
prioritization of efforts in determining which interests are to be resourced and
which interests must conversely be deferred or addressed by other means.
Necessarily, this environment will require the extraction of maximum strategic efficiency from the means available. In this regard, the SOF-airpower
team provides a uniquely high level of strategic return on investment across
the spectrum of irregular warfare which remains unrivaled within the military element of national power.
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